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One of the most intractable problems associated with studying representation in the U.S. House 
of Representatives involves the measurement of district-level constituency opinion. In measuring 
constituency opinion in House districts, scholars have relied on a number of alternative approaches,
including the use of demographic variables, small-sample estimates of public opinion, presidential
election results, referenda data, and “bottom-up” simulated opinion. In this article we develop an
innovative “top-down” simulation of House district opinion that provides more reliable and valid
measures of House district ideology. We model state-level ideology (as measured by Erikson, Wright,
and McIver 1993) as a function of various demographic and political variables found at both the state
and House district levels, and then use the estimates from the state-level model to generate predicted
ideology scores for each House district during the 1980s and 1990s. Our findings suggest that 
the top-down simulated measure is a valid indicator of House district ideology that can be used in 
a number of research venues.
Representation is particularly important to democratic theory. According to
Eulau et al. (1959), representation is what makes democratic legislatures both
legitimate and authoritative decision-making institutions. Likewise, Key (1961)
notes, the representation of public opinion is widely regarded as one of the 
distinguishing characteristics of democracy. Dahl (1989) further contends that 
the primary justification for democratic governments is found in their ability to
provide an orderly and peaceful process for representation to occur.
Considering the important role that representation plays in democracies, the
study of representation has occupied a central place in the field of political science
and has long captivated the interest of both theorists and empirical analysts.
Although scholars have explored a range of representational behaviors, the focus
of much of this research has been on what Eulau and Karps (1978) have referred
to as policy responsiveness, which we define as the degree to which legislators
reflect in their roll-call behavior the policy views of their constituents.
The concept of policy representation requires at least some level of congru-
ence between the policy views of constituents and the policy behavior of repre-
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sentatives. Using a variety of data sources and analytical approaches, scholars
have mapped out some of the basic contours of the linkage between constituency
policy preferences and legislative behavior (Erikson 1978; Glazer and Robbins
1985; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; Miller and Stokes 1963). Moreover, other
scholars have gone a bit further by exploring variation in representational behav-
ior across legislators and constituency contexts (Ahuja 1994; Glazer and Robbins
1985; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing 1994; Hibbing 1984; Jackson and King 1989;
McCrone and Kuklinski 1979; Thomas 1985).
Clearly, studying the relationship between constituency policy preferences 
and legislative roll-call behavior requires one to be able to measure these two
concepts. Legislative roll-call data are readily available over time and across 
a range of legislative bodies, so the dependent variable in studies of policy 
congruence can usually be obtained without difficulty. Unfortunately, the same
cannot be said about the key independent variable, constituency ideology. For 
the most part, data on constituency preferences are either unavailable or very 
difficult to collect. While reliable data on constituency policy preferences at the
state level are available (Berry et al. 1998; Erikson and Palfrey 1993), data on
constituency policy preferences in legislative districts below the state level are
almost impossible to obtain. This has meant that legislative scholars have had a
difficult time in studying policy responsiveness in the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, state legislatures, and local legislatures such as city councils and school
boards.
Of course, the fact that policy responsiveness is difficult to study does not mean
that legislative scholars have not tried, particularly with regard to the U.S. House
of Representatives. Over the years legislative scholars have struggled to measure
the ideological and policy dispositions of House members’ constituencies. They
have utilized a number of techniques and data sources to estimate constituency
opinion in U.S. House districts, including small-sample estimates of public
opinion (e.g., Miller and Stokes 1963), demographic variables (Erikson 1978;
Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Page et al. 1984; Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 1965;
Weber and Shaffer 1972; Wink, Livingston, and Garand 1996), presidential elec-
tion results (Fleisher 1993; Glazer and Robbins 1985; Johannes 1984; LeoGrande
and Jeydel 1997; Nice and Cohen 1983), congressional roll-call votes (Holbrook-
Provow and Poe 1987), referenda voting (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975;
Hedlund and Friesema 1972; Kuklinski 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979) 
and “bottom-up” simulated opinion based on the extension of estimates from
individual-level models to the aggregate district level (Erikson 1978; Sullivan and
Minns 1976; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978; Uslaner and Weber 1979; Weber et al.
1972). Due to questions of validity, these measures of constituency opinion have
proven to be considerably less satisfying than what one would obtain if large-
sample estimates of opinion were available across all districts. Unfortunately, the
great expense of conducting district-by-district surveys means that such large-
sample estimates of opinion are not available for House districts, nor are they
likely to become available in the foreseeable future.
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In this article we suggest a potential solution to this problem. In particular, 
we modify the traditional simulation approach used by scholars such as Erikson
(1978) and Uslaner and Weber (1979) in order to develop valid and more reli-
able estimates of constituency liberalism in House districts. However, rather than
the traditional “bottom-up” simulation, in which data from a lower level of aggre-
gation (i.e., from individual-level surveys) are used to simulate opinion at a
higher level of aggregation (i.e., the district level), we develop a “top-down” sim-
ulation approach, which involves using data from a higher level of aggregation
(i.e., the American states) to simulate opinion at a lower level of aggregation (i.e.,
the House district level). Based on data on mass state ideology compiled by
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), we estimate the relationship between state
opinion ideology, on one hand, and various demographic variables, presidential
election results, and other independent variables, on the other. Once we have esti-
mated the parameters of the state-level model of constituent ideology, we substi-
tute analogous data from House districts into the model to yield predicted levels
of congressional district ideology. We suggest that the result is valid estimates of
House district ideology that reflect the observed relationships between constituent
ideology and various independent variables at the state level, as well as the values
on these independent variables in U.S. House districts.
Measuring Constituent Ideology in U.S. House Districts
Given the substantial amount of attention paid to policy responsiveness in the
U.S. House, it is clear that legislative scholars have had to develop surrogate
measures of constituency preferences at the House district level. Most scholars
agree that the prevailing measures in the literature are less than optimal. Ideally,
one would want to have data drawn from large-scale samples in each of the 435
congressional districts and then use these data to derive point estimates of con-
stituency preferences. Unfortunately, such an approach would strain the limited
resources available for social-science research in the United States, and to date
no such data collection effort has been made. Given this, scholars have had to
rely on available data to provide rough estimates of House district ideology.
Small Sample Estimates of District Opinion
In lieu of large-sample estimates of district opinion, scholars have employed
national samples with relatively small numbers of respondents from each of the
sampled congressional districts. For instance, in their seminal work on legisla-
tive representation Miller and Stokes (1963) utilized data from the 1958 Ameri-
can National Election Study survey to estimate policy preferences at the district
level and explore how those preferences were related to legislators’ roll-call
behavior. However, the mean sample size for House districts was merely 11 usable
respondents, which is considerably below the sample sizes used in conventional
surveys to estimate public opinion. Consequently, the resulting estimates of 
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constituency opinion were extremely inefficient. While Erikson (1978) does note
that point estimates derived from such small random samples are unlikely to be
biased—i.e., such small samples are equally likely to overestimate opinion as
underestimate opinion—the sampling error associated with measures based on
such small samples is likely to be exceedingly high.1 Accordingly, the estimates
of constituent opinion derived from small samples are likely to be relatively far
removed from the actual (unobserved) opinion of the constituents. All in all, while
the use of small-sample estimates helped to establish the literature on legislative
responsiveness to constituency policy preferences, the significant limitations of
this approach render it inadequate for studies of legislative policy responsiveness.
Demographic Variables
One of the most common approaches used in studies of policy responsiveness
in the U.S. House is to measure constituency policy preferences using surrogate
demographic variables. Usually this involves estimating a model in which 
legislative roll-call behavior is depicted as a function of a wide range of district
demographic characteristics obtained from the U.S. Census. The demographic
variables employed in such studies typically include indicators of racial compo-
sition, education, income, age, social class, occupational distribution, urbaniza-
tion, home ownership, and family composition (Pool, Abelson, and Popkin 1965;
Sinclair-Deckard 1976; Weber and Shaffer 1972).
Scholars adopting such an approach make some important assumptions about
the political meaning of demographic characteristics. In particular, one assumes
that (1) individuals’ demographic characteristics are related systematically to
their policy preferences, (2) legislators are aware of the demographic composi-
tion of their districts and take those characteristics (or at least how they interpret
those characteristics) into account when making roll-call decisions, and (3) such
a relationship holds when one moves across levels of analysis (i.e., from the 
individual level to the aggregate level).
The first assumption is quite reasonable. Numerous studies have documented
the demographic underpinnings of public opinion and political behavior; citizens’
general ideology and their views on public policy matters are often found to be
related to their demographic characteristics. Such a relationship may be due to
the degree to which self-interest is reflected in citizens’ demographic character-
istics, or else demographic characteristics might represent how different groups
in society attain different sets of symbolic attitudes through the socialization
process.
Second, are legislators aware of the demographic characteristics of the con-
stituents that they represent, and do they interpret these characteristics in such a
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1 Erikson (1978) also points out that the relationships between known district demographic 
characteristics and estimates derived from small samples are typically weak, which suggest that the
small-sample estimates of constituency opinion are similarly inefficient.
way as to permit the demographic flavor of a district to affect their roll-call deci-
sions? Although there is only limited systematic evidence on this point (Erikson,
Luttbeg, and Holloway 1975; Hedlund and Friesema 1972), Fenno (1978) sug-
gests that members of the U.S. House think about their geographic constituen-
cies in terms of a number of attributes, including demographic characteristics. It
is reasonable to think that legislators are aware of the demographic characteris-
tics of their districts and consider those attributes in understanding their districts.
And, it should be noted, it is entirely plausible for House members and other 
legislators to consider politically relevant demographic characteristics as they 
cast roll-call votes.
The final assumption—i.e., that the relationship between aggregate demo-
graphic characteristics and aggregate policy preferences is a reflection of the
same relationships at the individual level—is less certain, since making such an
assumption has the potential of violating classic notions of the ecological fallacy.
Simply, processes that operate at the individual level need not be in effect at the
aggregate level. Although relationships found at the individual level often persist
at the aggregate level, one must clearly take great care in making inferences about
political processes across levels of analysis.
Ultimately, studies that rely on demographic variables to represent constituency
influences are quite limited. Demographic characteristics are only imperfectly
related to policy preferences among individual citizens. Although demographic
variables might have significant impact on individuals’ policy preferences, they
typically explain only a small amount of the variance in such preferences, and
this means that roll-call models that simply rely on demographic variables are
missing a substantial portion of the effect of constituency preferences. Moreover,
the uncertainty surrounding the policy implications of demographic variables
means that the policy signals directed at legislators by their constituents’ demo-
graphic characteristics are somewhat ambiguous. Knowing, for instance, that a
district has a high proportion of its citizens with a college education does not
necessarily give a legislator clear, unambiguous signals about the policy prefer-
ences of constituents, since this demographic characteristic, like others, is not
perfectly related to policy preferences.
Presidential Election Results
Numerous scholars have also relied on presidential election results as a 
surrogate measure of district ideological orientation (Fleisher 1993; Glazer and
Robbins 1985; Johannes 1984; LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997; Nice and Cohen
1983). The logic underlying this is grounded in standard spatial models of elec-
toral choice. Arguably, many citizens cast their votes in presidential elections by
comparing their own ideological positions with those of the competing candi-
dates. Insofar as aggregate presidential election results reflect ideological voting
in the electorate, scholars should be able to utilize presidential election results at
the district level as a proxy measure of district ideology.
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One of the problems with this approach is that not all presidential elections are
equally ideological in nature. Most observers agree that certain presidential elec-
tions are highly ideological and that the presidential election results from those
elections reflect the ideological characteristics of constituencies; the 1964, 1972,
and 1988 elections come immediately to mind as elections in which support for
the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates was differentiated by ide-
ological considerations. On the other hand, some elections are known for their
detachment from ideology; the 1968 and 1976 elections are often characterized
as being somewhat less ideological than other elections. Clearly, not all presi-
dential elections are equally ideological, and this affects the degree to which
scholars can use district-level presidential elections results as a surrogate for 
district ideology.
Several scholars have investigated the ideological nature of aggregate 
presidential election results. Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald (1984) and
Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1986) have utilized factor-analytic techniques to
determine the dimensionality of presidential election results at the state level.
They uncover two dimensions, one of which is an ideological dimension, the other
a partisan dimension. Given these results, it would appear that presidential 
election results in general are not exclusively ideological in nature, though some
elections are more ideological than others.
More recently, LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) explore the possibility of utiliz-
ing presidential election results as a surrogate for district ideology. They find only
moderate correlations for presidential election results between adjacent elections,
suggesting that the reliability of the aggregate presidential vote is not extremely
high. Ultimately, this leads them to conclude that the presidential vote is not a
consistent proxy for the long-term effects implied by constituency ideological 
orientations. Moreover, LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) confirm the findings of
Rabinowitz, Gurian, and MacDonald (1984) and Rabinowitz and MacDonald
(1986) that presidential election results can best be represented by two dimen-
sions, one partisan and the other ideological. While the ideological dimension is
the more important of the two, LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) contend that the
consistently significant partisan dimension suggests that ideology is not the only
long-term factor that affects presidential voting.
Unfortunately, one cannot readily utilize factor scores derived from a factor
analysis of district-level presidential election results to measure ideology at 
the district level. House districts change after every redistricting period, so it is
impossible to utilize district-level presidential election data across decades in a
factor analysis designed to create a general district ideology score. Even between
census years and redistricting, it is difficult to utilize this approach in measuring
district ideology. A factor analysis of presidential election results during, say, the
1970s would include one election (i.e., 1972) that is considered highly ideologi-
cal, but would also include a nonideological election (i.e., 1976). Some presi-
dential elections (i.e., 1964, 1972, 1988, and 1992) load more heavily on the
ideological dimension, and LeoGrande and Jeydel (1997) suggest that scholars
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should only utilize data from these elections as a proxy measure of district 
ideology.
Referenda Results
One of the most innovative approaches to measuring district ideology involves
the use of referenda data. In referenda elections, voters are confronted with one
or more policy positions on which they can express their preferences. A number
of states hold referenda elections on a regular basis, and scholars have found it
possible to utilize district-level data on referenda election results to estimate the
policy preferences and/or ideological orientation of a given constituency.
The use of referenda data as a surrogate measure of constituency policy 
preferences is best represented by the work of Kuklinski (1977) and McCrone
and Kuklinski (1979). In both studies the authors utilize data from California 
referenda to estimate the positions of district constituencies on three dimensions
that emerge from a factor analysis of the referenda data. While these scholars
find that referenda data can provide quite reliable measures of district ideology,
unfortunately such data are available for only a limited number of states. While
referenda data measures can be used successfully in the limited number of states
that utilize referenda elections, scholars must rely on other sources of data to
measure constituent ideology for the vast majority of districts.
“Bottom-Up” Simulations
Another innovation in the measurement of district opinion and constituency
policy preferences is the use of simulated district opinion, a technique developed
by Weber and Shaffer (1972) and subsequently utilized by several legislative
scholars (Erikson 1978; Sullivan and Minns 1976; Sullivan and Uslaner 1978;
Uslaner and Weber 1979). This approach is designed to take advantage of demo-
graphic data that are available at the district level, as well as knowledge con-
cerning the relationship between individuals’ demographic characteristics and
their policy positions. In traditional simulations of constituency opinion, schol-
ars utilize what we refer to as a “bottom-up” simulation—i.e., data from a lower
level of aggregation (i.e., from individual-level surveys) are used to simulate
opinion at a higher level of aggregation (i.e., the district level). This involves the
following steps. First, survey data are used to estimate the relationship at the
microlevel between individuals’ various demographic characteristics (e.g., race,
income, etc.) and their opinions or attitudes (e.g., liberalism). Care is taken to
select survey items that are analogous to variables found at the aggregate (dis-
trict) level. Second, once the individual-level regression estimates are obtained,
the mean district characteristics on these independent variables are substituted
into the regression model to yield predicted district-level opinion. The implica-
tion of this approach is that, if individual-level variables are related to individ-
ual-level opinion, then aggregations of those individual-level variables should be
related to aggregations of (district-level) opinion.
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On the face of it, this approach appears to be quite reasonable. The logic under-
lying the approach seems to be sensible, and simulated measures of opinion have
been found to have a stronger association with roll-call behavior than measures
based on small-sample estimates (Erikson 1978). Most importantly, the general
availability of demographic and political variables with which to simulate public
opinion means that this approach can be applied to estimating district opinion
across a wide range of districts and across time.
Perhaps the most important concern that one might have with this approach is
that the individual-level regressions upon which the simulations are based often
exhibit exceedingly low levels of fit to the data. With adjusted R2 levels that often
fall below .20, measures of simulated district-level opinion have a significantly
large amount of random error associated with them. This is not necessarily a 
surprise, since the level of measurement error in individual-level survey data 
is often much higher than that found in aggregate-level data. Ultimately, while
bottom-up simulated measures may be an improvement over those obtained 
from other analytical approaches, they remain somewhat imprecise indicators of
constituency opinion.
An Alternative Approach: “Top-Down” Simulation
Clearly, scholars have struggled to measure constituency opinion in U.S. House
districts. Unfortunately, the various approaches found in the literature are less
than satisfactory, either due to their availability for only a limited set of districts
or years or because of their high levels of measurement or sampling error. Given
that previous measures of district opinion have proven to be inadequate, we
develop a more reliable and useful measure of district opinion by employing 
an alternative approach to simulating constituency ideology. Specifically, we use
a “top-down” simulation approach, which involves using data from a higher level
of aggregation (i.e., the American states) to simulate opinion at a lower level of
aggregation (i.e., congressional districts).
First, we use state-level data to estimate the relationship between state ideol-
ogy, as measured by Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993), and various demo-
graphic and political variables. Once we estimate the parameters of the model of
state ideology, we substitute analogous data from U.S. House districts into the
model to yield predicted levels of opinion liberalism for House districts. The
results provide improved estimates of House district ideology that reflect the
observed relationships between constituent ideology and various independent
variables at the state level, as well as the values on these independent variables
in U.S. House districts.
It should be noted that we estimate separate models of state ideology for the
1980s and 1990s.2 Individual models for each decade are necessary due to 
possible changes in the relationship between various independent variables and
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2 The districts demographics employed for the 1980s model were based on the districts recognized
by the U.S. Congress for the 98th–102nd Congresses (1982–1990) and for the 1990s model the dis-
tricts recognized by the U.S. Congress for the 104th–107th Congresses (1994–2000).
constituency ideology over time and to the unavailability of presidential election
results across redistricting periods.
Modeling State-Level Constituency Ideology
The first step in developing a “top-down” simulated measure of U.S. House
district ideology is to establish a model of constituency ideology at the state level
that can be used to simulate U.S. House district constituency ideology. The model
must include a range of independent variables measured at the state level that are
analogous to variables available for congressional districts.
The dependent variable in our model is state ideology, as measured originally
by Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) and Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993).
Utilizing data from the CBS News/New York Times surveys from 1976 to 1988,
Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993) created large-sample estimates of state 
political ideology. By aggregating respondents’ ideological self-reports across
surveys, Erikson and his colleagues created samples for each state that were 
sufficiently large to provide quite reliable estimates of state political ideology.
Utilizing questions measuring respondents’ ideological identity, they coded
respondents as liberal, moderate, or conservative, and then measured the ideo-
logical orientation for each state as the mean ideology score for respondents resid-
ing in each state.3
We include in our model several independent variables that one might expect
to be related to state ideology and for which data are available for U.S. House
districts. First, following LeoGrande and Jeydel’s (1997) argument that presi-
dential election results from highly ideological elections can be used as surro-
gates for district ideology, we include in our model a variable to represent the
effects of state-level presidential election results. For the 1980s model of state
ideology, Democratic presidential vote is measured as the average percentage of
the vote for Democratic candidates in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections.
For the 1990s model of state ideology Democratic presidential vote is measured
as the average percentage of the vote for Democratic candidates in the 1992 and
1996 presidential elections.4 We hypothesize that the coefficient for Democratic
Measuring Constituency Ideology in U.S. House Districts 1173
3 While Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s published measures of state and partisan ideology only
include data for the period 1976–1988, they have provided us with their updated database of CBS
News/New York Times surveys through 1992. Utilizing this database and their methodology, we have
updated the measures of state and partisan ideology through 1992. While the updated data do provide
measures of state ideology that are more up-to-date and reliable, it is noteworthy that the updated
measures of state ideology are highly correlated with the original measures of state ideology (R2 =
.901). The updated variable is coded so that high scores indicate more conservative states.
4 These four presidential elections are selected using a principal components factor analysis that
included all presidential elections between 1976 and 1996 and Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s (1993)
state ideology scores. The four selected elections loaded most heavily on an ideological dimension
with the state ideology scores. A principal components factor analysis conducted with the four pres-
idential elections included in our model and Erikson, Wright, and McIver state ideology measures
confirm the ideological nature of each election. Each of the elections loads heavily on the single ide-
ological dimension.
presidential vote, b1, will be negative, indicating that states in which the Demo-
cratic presidential candidate makes a strong showing will be less conservative
than those states in which the Democratic candidate runs poorly.
We also include a series of demographic variables found in previous research
to be related to mass state ideology. These include the proportion of blue-collar
workers in the state workforce, the proportion of the population living in urban
areas, the proportion of homeowners among all households, and a dichotomous
variable representing the Deep South region. We hypothesize that the size of 
the blue-collar work force and the number of urban residents will be negatively
related to state conservatism, while home ownership and the Deep South region
will be positively related to state conservatism.5
Given this, our first-stage model upon which our estimates of House district
ideology are based is as follows:
Estimating Ideology in U.S. House Districts
It is important to note that the major reason for estimating a model of state-
level ideology is to permit us to estimate the ideological orientations of U.S.
House district constituencies. Once we estimate our model of state ideology, we
substitute U.S. House district-level values on each of the independent variables
in the model and multiply each value by its associated unstandardized regression
coefficient. The resulting predicted values represent the estimated ideological 
orientation of each U.S. House district, based on (1) the observed relationship
between these variables and state ideology and (2) the values of these variables
for each U.S. House district.
State Ideology a b Average Democratic Presidential Vote
b % Blue Collar Workers b  Urban Population
b % Home Ownership b Deep South
2 3
4 5
= + ( )
+ ( ) + ( )
+ ( ) + ( )
1
%
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5 It should be noted that data were collected for a wide range of state and district-level character-
istics that could conceivably serve as theoretically plausible independent variables in a model of state
or district ideology. In addition to the variables listed in our model, data on over a dozen alternative
state and district level characteristics were collected and tested in our model, including industry/occu-
pation categories, education levels, individual/family income, home ownership, marital status, family
size, and race and ethnicity. These variables were not included in our model for one of three reasons:
(1) their coefficients were statistically nonsignificant or they did not otherwise improve the fit of the
model; (2) the relationship between the variables and constituency ideology differed between states
and House districts; or (3) reliable measures were not available at both the state and House district
levels. Considering that the fundamental goal of our model is to develop reliable measures of simu-
lated House district ideology, we utilize only demographic variables that improve the fit of the model
and that exhibit a relationship with the Democratic presidential vote that can be shown to be similar
at both the state and House district levels. Bivariate correlations are employed to confirm similar rela-
tionships between the demographic variables employed in our model and the proportion of con-
stituents who voted for the Democratic presidential candidate, which is a relatively reliable measure
of constituent ideology that is available at the state and House district level. (Interested readers can
obtain a copy of these correlations by writing the lead author.)
A Caveat: The Race Problem
Any casual observer of American politics is aware of the relationship between
race and ideology. Black and other minority citizens are, on average, more liberal
than nonminority citizens (Tate 1993). In the aggregate, it is not unreasonable to
expect that districts or states with large black or minority populations will be sig-
nificantly more liberal than districts or states without large black or minority pop-
ulations. Moreover, black and other minority legislators are generally more liberal
than their nonminority colleagues, though they often depend on large black or
minority populations in their districts to be elected to Congress (Lublin 1997).
Given this, one could argue that any model of mass state ideology—or, for that
matter, district ideology—should include as an independent variable a measure
of the proportion of black or minority citizens in the population. It is reasonable
to think that higher proportions of black and other minorities in state electorates
would be related to higher levels of roll-call liberalism among U.S. Senators and
that, knowing this, the same relationship would be observed in the U.S. House.
Unfortunately for our purposes, the American states are much more homoge-
neous in terms of racial composition than are U.S. House districts. In terms of
percent black population, the states range from a low of .22% (Montana) to a
high of 36% (Mississippi), and the standard deviation across states is 9.27 in the
1980s, 9.24 in the 1990s, and 9.21 for the two decades combined. This compares
to a range of black population proportions in House districts of .07% to 92.07%,
and a standard deviation of 14.87 in the 1980s, 16.12 in the 1990s, and 15.50 for
the two decades combined. Most importantly, in no state does the minority and/or
black proportion exceed (or even approach) 50%. This is a crucial issue, for it
appears that the relationship between minority population and district ideology
is nonlinear. For those districts or states with racial minority population 
proportions below 50%, increases in the minority population are associated with
greater aggregate ideological conservatism. For those districts or states with
racial minority population proportions above 50%, the opposite is true; increases
in minority population proportions are associated with lower levels of ideologi-
cal conservatism. Consequently, the direction of the relationship between racial
composition and constituent ideology is different for states and congressional dis-
tricts. These different relationships for house districts and states are displayed
vividly in Figure 1, using the Democratic presidential vote as a surrogate for con-
stituent ideology.
It should be noted that in a preliminary analysis we estimated the state ideol-
ogy model to include the black and/or minority populations in each state as one
of the independent variables. Surprisingly, the coefficients for black or minority
population proportions are all positive, suggesting that increases in black or
minority populations are associated with higher levels of ideological conser-
vatism. One possible explanation for this pattern is the hostility, or threat, hypoth-
esis (Lublin 1997). The central idea underlying this hypothesis is that white (and
presumably more conservative) citizens respond to the racial composition of their
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districts. When blacks or other ethnic groups are in a minority, white citizens
begin to perceive an increased threat as the proportion of minority group
members begins to approach 50% of the overall population. At relatively high
black or minority population proportions, white citizens perceive the greatest
threat, and they respond with increased levels of ideological conservatism to
counterbalance the liberalism of black citizens. This creates a higher level of ide-
ological polarization that benefits the white (conservative) majority population,
and the result is that legislators representing these districts are often more con-
servative than those with small black populations. On the other hand, in House
districts which have black and/or minority population proportions in excess of
50%, black and/or minority voters have the upper hand, and the ideological 
liberalism of the constituency increases as that percentage increases. Hence, the
positive relationship between black or minority population and constituency con-
servatism observed below the 50% mark becomes a negative relationship above
that mark. What this means is that, in the population of states (where the black
and/or minority populations are always below 50%), a negative relationship
between racial composition and ideological conservatism is observed. In the pop-
ulation of House districts, the opposite relationship is expected.
Finally, since we are using relationships observed in the states to estimate
House district ideology, we assume that the relationships observed in the states
are similar to those found for House districts. With regard to race, this is clearly
not the case. To utilize the relationship between racial composition and con-
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FIGURE 1
State/District 1988 Democratic Presidential Vote and Percent Black
Population
stituency ideology at the state level to estimate U.S. House district ideology would
lead one to expect House districts with a significantly large (70–100%) black pop-
ulation to be the most conservative! Clearly, the relationship between racial com-
position and district ideology is nonlinear, and the truncated variance on the racial
composition variable among the states prevents a precise enough estimation of
the nonlinear relationship to apply the relationship to House districts. Ultimately,
we are left with no other alternative than to discard the race variable from our
models. Fortunately, at least some of the effects of race are likely to be captured
in other variables such as the Democratic presidential vote, urban population, and
home ownership.6
Empirical Results
State-Level Estimates
We begin with the OLS regression estimates for our model of state-level mass
ideology, estimated separately for the 1980s and 1990s; these results are presented
in Table 1. For the most part, the models fit the data quite well. The adjusted R2
for our model is above .70 for both the 1980s and 1990s analyses, suggesting that
nearly three-fourths of the variance in mass state ideology is explained by the
independent variables included in our model.7 The strong fit of the model is
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6 Evidence of this assertion is seen in the statistically significant (p < .001) correlation coefficients
between proportion black population and Democratic presidential vote (.607), urban population
(.234), home ownership (-.422), and ultimately our simulated measure of House district ideology
(.833).
7 It is important to contrast the goodness-of-fit levels for our top-down simulation model with those
from models used in bottom-up simulations of district opinion. For the purpose of comparison 
we develop several models of individual-level ideology using data the American National Election
Studies from 1976 to 2000. The highest adjusted R2 attained through these models is .20, which is
in line with results of previous bottom-up simulations. (Model results can be obtained from the lead
author.) The weak fit of the models is largely due to the substantial amount of measurement error
found in survey data upon which bottom-up simulations are based. Consequently, the estimates of
the impact of demographic and other variables on individual-level opinion are relatively inefficient,
the fallout of which is that the resulting simulated opinion has a fair amount of random measurement
error associated with it.
On the other hand, because of the strong goodness-of-fit for our aggregate-level model, the 
predicted values derived from that model closely track the observed value for state ideology. (For
confirmation, see Figure 2A and 2B.) Assuming that similar relationships between the independent
variables and the (unobserved) ideological orientation of House districts are in place, the strong good-
ness-of-fit in the state model suggests that the amount of random measurement error that often char-
acterizes simulations based on a bottom-up approach will be much lower. In other words, the estimates
of House constituency ideology based on the top-down simulation should be more efficient than those
based on the bottom-up simulation approach. Because the R2 values for models employing aggregate
data will naturally be higher than those that employ individual-level data, direct comparisons between
standard bottom-up models of state ideology (which typically report R2 values of less than .20) and
graphically displayed in Figures 2A and 2B, in which we present for the 1980s
and 1990s scatter plots of observed state ideology and the values of state ideol-
ogy predicted by our models. Clearly, our model does a good job in explaining
state ideology. Based on this, as well as our assumptions stated above, we would
expect our model to do a reasonably good job at simulating constituency opinion
in U.S. House districts.
The coefficients for the model are, with a few exceptions, consistent with
expectations. As has been suggested in recent research (e.g., LeoGrande and
Jeydel 1997), the Democratic presidential vote is negatively and significantly
related to our measure of mass state ideology; simply, states that provided
Michael Dukakis, Walter Mondale, and Bill Clinton with relatively high-vote 
proportions exhibit the lowest level of mass ideological conservatism. As
expected, the proportion of residents living in urban areas is also significantly
and inversely related to mass state conservatism. Conversely, the coefficients for
the variables representing states of the Deep South and the proportion of state
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TABLE 1
Model of State Ideology, 1980s and 1990s
1980s 1990s
Standardized Standardized
Variables b Coefficients t b Coefficients t
(Constant) 12.593 .826 25.570 1.3377
Democratic -.561 -.396 -4.451*** -.674 -.502 -5.924***
Presidential Vote
% Who Own Home .485 .307 2.600*** .342 .200 1.786**
% Blue Collar Workers -.154 -.097 -.977 -.005 -.030 -.265
% Urban Population -.009 -.251 -2.311*** -.009 -.230 -2.159***
Deep South 7.114 .380 4.130*** 8.297 .443 4.919***
R-Square .741 .736
Adjusted R-Square .701 .704
Number of Cases 48 48
***p < .01 level, one-tailed test.
**p < .05 level, one-tailed test.
*p < .10 level, one-tailed test.
the top-down models reported here (which have R2 values in excess of .70) must be made only with
caution.
As further evidence of the weakness of the bottom-up simulation methods, we explore the rela-
tionships among the bottom-up simulated state ideology measures, Wright, Erikson, and McIver’s
state ideology measures, and the average Democratic presidential vote in ideological elections
throughout the period. While the Pearson correlations between the presidential vote and the top-down
simulated measures are .35 and significant at the .001 level, the correlations between the bottom-up
simulated measures and Wright, Erikson, and McIver measures of state ideology are only .10 and not
statistically significant.
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FIGURE 2A
1980s State Ideology and Predicted State Ideology Scatterplot
FIGURE 2B
1990s State Ideology and Predicted State Ideology Scatterplot
residents who are homeowners are both significant and positive, indicating that
states from the Deep South and states with a large proportion of homeowners
have significantly higher levels of mass ideological conservatism. Finally,
although the proportion of blue collar workers appears to be inversely associated
with mass ideological conservatism, the coefficients for this variable are not 
statistically significant in either decade.
Simulating House District Opinion
Having developed and estimated our model of state mass ideology, we utilize
the coefficients from the model to generate constituent ideology predictions in
each House district for the 1980s and 1990s. This is done by substituting values
from each House district and for each variable in the model into the prediction
equation and solving the equation to generate a predicted value for each House
district.8
In Table 2 we report the descriptive statistics for the simulated measure of
House district ideology and include the descriptive statistics for the Erikson et
al. measure of state ideology as a point of comparison. First, the mean score for
the state mass ideology measure is 13.79, as compared to the mean House dis-
trict ideology of 10.61 for the 1980s and 10.78 for the 1990s. This is not a large
difference, but it does suggest that constituents from House districts are, on
average, marginally less conservative than state constituencies. This may be due
in part to the fact that more populous states are, on average, somewhat more
liberal than smaller states; the larger number of House districts from these more
populous (and more liberal) states results in an average House district ideology
that is more liberal than the average (unweighted) state. Clearly, there are some
very liberal House districts but no very liberal states.
Second, as can be seen in Table 2 the dispersion of the House district ideology
measure is much greater than for the Erikson, Wright, and McIver state ideology
measures. The range of the state ideology variable is from -1.42 (for Rhode
Island) to 27.32 (for Idaho), and the standard deviation is 7.68. On the other hand,
for the estimates of House district ideology, the range is much greater, from -
46.71 (16th District in New York) to 32.44 (9th District in Georgia) for the 1980s
and -42.50 (16th District in New York) to 35.47 (10th District in North Carolina)
for the 1990s. Moreover, the standard deviations are 13.67 for the 1980s and
13.71 for the 1990s model.9 In one real sense, this is not surprising. While state
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8 For example, the ideology score for the 1st District of California (1990s) is based on the follow-
ing political and demographic district characteristics: (1) 47.5% average Democratic presidential vote;
(2) 63.2% home owners; (3) 26.4% blue collar workers; (4) 38.98% urban residents; and (5) 0 for a
non-Deep South state. Given the regression coefficients presented in Table 3 and the values on the
independent variables, the predicted value is 10.32: CA House District 1 = 25.570 + [-.674 * (47.5)]
+ [.342 * (63.2)] + [-.057 * (26.4)] + [-.087 * (38.98)] + [8.297 * (0)].
9 The liberal 16th District of New York is located in the South Bronx. It is described in Congres-
sional Quarterly’s Politics in America as a solidly democratic district and as “one of the most 
boundaries are fixed, and while the populations of states change relatively slowly,
House districts are often drawn to represent common interests that are somewhat
narrow in nature. Furthermore, while states are large enough to avoid relatively
extreme ideo-logical orientations, House districts are small enough that some will
be on the extreme ends of the ideological distribution. For instance, while no state
has a black population that is in the majority, there are numerous House districts
that have very large black populations, and these districts are likely to have pop-
ulations that are more liberal than the most liberal state. Moreover, the enhanced
variance in the mass ideological orientations of House districts represents not
only between-state differences, but also differences that exist within states. For
instance, even the most conservative (liberal) state will have House districts that
are more conservative (liberal) than the state mean; this means that the range for
constituency ideology will be greater than that for the states.
Validity Issues
How valid is our measure of House district ideology? One way of ascer-
taining the validity of our measure is to compare our measure of House district
ideology with “known” ideological characteristics. If known liberal (conserva-
tive) districts exhibit consistently low (high) scores on our district ideology
measure, then it would appear that our measure has some level of validity. Of
course, the problem is that dependable measures of district ideology are not
readily available.
REFERENDA DATA. Referenda data have proven to be an indirect but dependable
measure of district ideology. While referenda data are available for only a very
limited number of congressional districts, such data are available for the 52 U.S.
House districts of California. In order to demonstrate the validity of our measure
of simulated district ideology, we compare it to district voting returns on several
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics for Predicted State and District Ideology
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
State Ideology (1976–1992) -1.42 27.32 13.79 7.68
1980s State Predicted Ideologies -2.52 24.65 13.53 6.73
1980s District Predicted Ideologies -46.71 32.44 10.61 13.67
1990s State Predicted Ideologies -1.78 25.56 13.61 6.73
1990s District Predicted Ideologies -42.50 35.47 10.78 13.71
economically devastated areas in the United States.” The conservative 10th District of North Carolina
is described in Politics in America as “the most rock-ribbed Republican district in North Carolina.”
In 1990 GOP Senator Jesse Helms posted his best showing in the 10th Congressional District.
referenda faced by California voters in the 1996 general election. These refer-
enda include votes on four traditional ideological issues, which include Proposi-
tion 210 (increasing the state’s minimum wage), Proposition 214 (healthcare
consumer protection), Proposition 217 (increasing the state income tax), and
Proposition 218 (limits on property tax).10
As a starting point, we consider the bivariate correlations between our measure
of simulated district ideology and the district voting returns on the four ideolog-
ical propositions (results not shown). Overall, the correlations strongly support
the validity of our simulated measure of district ideology. Our measure of dis-
trict ideology is significantly correlated ( p < .001) with each of the referenda
votes, with the mean correlation equal to .841 and a minimum correlation of .704.
Moreover, the simulated district ideology measure exhibits a correlation of at
least .850 with the referenda votes on an increase in the minimum wage and limits
on property tax, two classic ideological issues in American politics.
We also conduct a principal components factor analysis of the intercorrelations
among the four propositions and our measure of district ideology (results not
shown). As expected, voting support for the four propositions and our measure
of district ideology all load heavily on a single factor, indicating that they 
represent a single ideological dimension. Clearly, if one accepts that these four
referenda issues represent the ideological preferences of California voters, one
can accept that our measure of district ideology provides a consistent gauge of
the ideological preferences of California congressional districts.11
PREDICTIVE RELIABILITY. Another way of testing the validity of our measure of
simulated House district ideology is to explore the degree to which the measure
predicts outcomes that should be theoretically related to House district ideology.
Specifically, to what extent is our measure related to congressional roll-call
behavior? If our measure is valid, it should serve as a good predictor of and be
strongly related to roll-call behavior. Moreover, if the relationship between 
the simulated measures of House district ideology and House members’ roll-call
behavior is at least somewhat similar in magnitude and significance to the 
relationship between established measures of state ideology and Senate roll-call
behavior, this would reinforce the view that our district ideology measure has
high validity.
In order to consider the relationship between roll-call voting and constituency
ideology, we estimate models that depict roll-call behavior as a function of our
measure of district ideology, as well as the political party of each member, coded
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10 A full description of the propositions employed in this analysis is available from the lead author
or from the California Secretary of State Web Site http://www.ss.ca.gov. While a total of fifteen propo-
sitions were voted on during the 1996 general election, we employ content and factor analyses to
select the most ideological issues.
11 Tables reporting the bivariate correlations between our measure of simulated district ideology
and district voting results on the four ideological propositions, as well as results of the principal com-
ponents analysis, are available and can be obtained by writing the authors.
1 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats.12 We utilize a measure of roll-call ideol-
ogy based on Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997) spatial analysis of roll-call voting
from 1789 to 1996. The Poole-Rosenthal scores range from -1.00 (strong liberal)
to +1.00 (strong conservative).13 Moreover, we estimate our models in two ways:
(1) with separate pooled analysis using data for all senators and House members,
respectively, during the 98th to 104th Congresses; and (2) with separate cross-
sectional analysis for each Congress individually. For the cross-sectional models,
we report ordinary least-squares (OLS) coefficients and for the pooled models
we report generalized estimation equation (GEE) coefficients.14
In Table 3 we report the GEE estimates for the pooled analysis of House and
Senate roll-call voting for the 98th to 104th congresses, with roll-call conser-
vatism depicted as a function of party and constituency ideology. First, for U.S.
senators the relationship between state ideology and roll-call voting is strong and
significant (b = .017, t = 9.025), even controlling for the effects of party. This
coefficient suggests that a six-point increase in state constituency conservatism
will result in approximately a one-tenth-point shift in the Poole-Rosenthal scale.
Since the scale ranges only from -1.00 to +1.00, this is not a trivial effect. Second,
for House members the effect of constituency ideology is about one-half the mag-
nitude of the Senate effect, but here again the effect is highly significant. (b =
.008, t = 19.428). For House members, approximately a 12-point increase in con-
stituency conservatism translates into a one-tenth-point shift in roll-call conser-
vatism. Given this, over the almost 80-point range of House district ideology, one
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12 This is a relatively simple specification of a model of roll-call behavior. One could include a
wider range of constituency variables in our model, as well as other characteristics of House members.
However, in a general model of roll-call behavior, other constituency variables will be expected to
reflect the general ideological character of each district. Since we include a measure of ideology that
reflects many of the demographic and political variables that one might use as surrogates of district
ideology in the first place, we see no need to control for these other variables in this simple model
of roll-call behavior.
13 Poole and Rosenthal utilize a dimensional scale technique that yields a dominant single dimen-
sion for roll-call votes that is applicable to roll-calls cast since 1789. Based on this analysis, each
member of Congress from 1789 to the present is assigned a score on this dimension. According to
Poole and Rosenthal, this single dimension can be viewed as a party loyalty dimension, insofar as it
separates Democrats and Republicans; however, because partisan cleavages that separate Democra-
tic and Republican members of Congress are based largely on ideological differences, these scores
are widely interpreted as a liberal-conservative dimension (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Lublin 1997).
14 OLS coefficients are not reported for the pooled models because they often involve violations of
OLS assumptions of homoskedasticity and uncorrelated error terms (Gujarati 1995, Kementa 1986).
While OLS estimates are unbiased in the presence of autocorrelation, these estimates are not effi-
cient, and the variability of OLS coefficients contaminates tests of statistical significance. Given this,
we estimate our pooled cross-sectional time-series models using the generalized estimation equation
(GEE) extension of the generalized least-squares (GLS) random-effects estimator (Diggle, Liang, and
Zeger 1994). This procedure is appropriate in cross-sectional dominant data sets, i.e., when the
number of cross-sections (members) is larger than the number of time points, and it can be used with
unbalanced data. Most importantly, this procedure yields parameter estimates that are uncontaminated
by the effects of autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors.
would predict that a House member representing the most liberal district would
be almost two-thirds of a point more liberal in roll-call behavior than a House
member representing the most conservative district, even controlling for the con-
siderable effects of party. So, while the effect of district ideology is somewhat
smaller in magnitude than the effect of state ideology, there remains strong 
evidence that our measure of district ideology behaves, as one would expect, as
a strong predictor of roll-call ideology.
This conclusion is reinforced in Table 4, in which we present the constituency
ideology coefficients for Senate and House members, calculated separately for
each Congress. We also report separate sets of coefficients for Republican and
Democratic Senators and House members. As one can readily see, the finding of
strong constituency effects on roll-call behavior is quite robust. In each Congress
the state ideology coefficients are positive and significant, indicating that in each
year state ideology has a strong effect on the roll-call behavior of U.S. Senators.
But more importantly, the coefficients for House district ideology are also 
positive and statistically significant in each Congress, suggesting that our measure
of district ideology has substantial ability to predict House members’ roll-call
ideology.
In addition, it appears that Republican and Democratic Senators and House
members respond in predictable ways to constituency ideology. Among Repub-
lican Senators and House members, the coefficients for the state ideology
measure are positive and highly significant, suggesting that Republicans are
responsive to the broad policy preferences of their constituents. Much the same
can be said for Democratic House member and Senators, with all of the coeffi-
cients in the expected positive direction and easily achieving conventional levels
of statistical significance. Overall, our findings suggest that all members—
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TABLE 3
Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Estimates for House and
Senate Models of Constituency Influence on Roll-Call Conservatism
U.S. Senate U.S. House
b t b t
Intercept -.701 -23.092*** -.407 -49.766***
Party (Republican = 1) .820 28.928*** .683 57.653***
Constituency Conservatism .017 9.025*** .008 19.428***
N 700 3036
R-Sqaure .779 .789
***p < .01 level, one-tailed test.
**p < .05 level, one-tailed test.
*p < .10 level, one-tailed test.
Note: T-statistics reported in this table are based on heteroskedastic robust standard errors.
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TABLE 4
OLS Estimates for House and Senate Models of Constituency Influence
on Roll-Call Conservatism, by Congress, 98th Congress to 104th
Congress
U.S. Senate U.S. House
All Members b t b t
98th Congress (1983–1984) .016 6.586*** .008 18.432***
99th Congress (1985–1986) .015 6.092*** .008 16.959***
100th Congress (1987–1988) .015 5.948*** .008 14.724***
101st Congress (1989–1990) .019 6.989*** .010 18.201***
102nd Congress (1991–1992) .020 7.459*** .010 19.194***
103rd Congress (1993–1994) .013 5.278*** .010 19.134***
104th Congress (1995–1996) .014 5.245*** .012 16.577***
Overall .017 9.025*** .008 19.428***
U.S. Senate U.S. House
Republicans b t b t
98th Congress (1983–1984) .014 3.394*** .010 6.552***
99th Congress (1985–1986) .013 3.120*** .009 6.561***
100th Congress (1987–1988) .016 3.435*** .009 5.878***
101st Congress (1989–1990) .024 5.092*** .012 6.358***
102nd Congress (1991–1992) .025 6.040*** .009 5.397***
103rd Congress (1993–1994) .019 3.965*** .008 5.276***
104th Congress (1995–1996) .020 5.292*** .008 6.284***
Overall .019 6.076*** .007 5.955***
U.S. Senate U.S. House
Democrats b t b t
98th Congress (1983–1984) .018 9.917*** .008 17.365***
99th Congress (1985–1986) .017 8.556*** .008 15.724***
100th Congress (1987–1988) .014 5.088*** .008 13.602***
101st Congress (1989–1990) .016 4.886*** .010 17.376***
102nd Congress (1991–1992) .016 4.942*** .010 18.643***
103rd Congress (1993–1994) .008 4.405*** .010 18.497***
104th Congress (1995–1996) .008 2.501*** .013 15.363***
Overall .015 6.785*** .009 19.687***
***p < .01 level, one tail test.
**p < .5 level, one tail test.
*p < .10 level, one tail test.
Republican and Democrat, House members or Senators—are responsive to con-
stituency policy preferences.
We suggest that these similar results provide support for the validity of our
simulated measure of House district ideology. Ultimately, given the weaknesses
found in available measures of district constituent ideology, the top-down 
simulated measure appears to provide a significantly improved measure of dis-
trict ideology.
Conclusion
Studies of policy representation are often based on the idea that legislators
respond to the policy preferences of their constituents. Estimating what those 
constituency policy preferences are has been a major problem for legislative
scholars. While there are some adequate measures of the ideological preferences
of Senate electorates (i.e., the states), adequate measures of constituency pre-
ferences of U.S. House members has thus far eluded legislative scholars.
Considering the significant weaknesses of available measures of district con-
stituency ideology, we develop in this work an improved measure of constituency
ideology in U.S. House districts. Utilizing a “top-down” simulation of House 
district opinion, we (1) model state-level ideology (as measured by Erikson,
Wright, and McIver 1993) as a function of the Democratic presidential vote and
various demographic variables found at both the state and congressional district
levels, and then (2) use the coefficient estimates from the state-level model and
characteristics of House districts to generate predicted ideology scores for each
House district during the 1980s and 1990s.
Preliminary tests of our simulated district ideology scores suggest the validity
of our measures. Specifically, the validity of our measure is supported by the
results of the analysis of the relationship between our simulated measures of U.S.
House district ideology and several ideological referenda faced by California
voters in the 1996 general election. Moreover, we are encouraged by analyses of
the relationship between our simulated measures and House roll-call voting that
are roughly comparable in magnitude and statistical significance to the relation-
ship found for roll-call voting among U.S. Senators and the established and reli-
able measures of mass state ideology developed by Erikson, Wright, and McIver
(1993).
We believe that our approach provides an improved measure of U.S. House
district ideology that may be used in a number of research areas. In particular,
we suggest that many studies of representation in the U.S. House have been
limited by the quality of measures of constituency policy preferences. With
improved measures, the study of legislative policy responsiveness could reach
new heights. What is the relationship between constituency preferences and roll-
call behavior? More importantly, what explains variation across legislators and
contexts in how legislators translate constituency preferences into roll-call behav-
ior? Are some legislators (e.g., those elected from marginal districts, those with
higher or lower levels of seniority) more responsive to their constituents than
others? Do some kinds of districts facilitate policy responsiveness? For instance,
are legislators who represent homogenous districts or districts with politically
engaged populations more responsive to their constituents than those who repre-
sent diverse districts or districts with inactive, inattentive constituents?
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Finally, it is worth noting that the approach that we have outlined here has
broad applicability for the estimation of constituency policy preferences in other
legislative settings. Is it possible, for instance, to estimate constituency ideology
for state senate and house districts, which are even less likely to be the subject
of systematic surveys? Could our approach be adjusted to provide estimates of
constituency preferences for state legislative districts? We believe that the answer
to this question is yes, and we suggest that the use of our approach has the poten-
tial for permitting scholars to extend studies of legislative policy representation
to a wider range of legislative venues.
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